I have a very hard time defining ‘scholarship’ (harder time doing it…). I’ve learned lots of good stuff from all sorts of “people of presupposition”.

I sometimes think we should qualify ‘scholarship’ more to avoid there being a firmer distinction between “scholarship” (i.e., secular scholarship), and “faith-based bible study”.

But this will too easily categorize people and prevent a freer flow of ideas. I have read a number of books and articles by people who “import” axioms etc. I cannot accept. Sometimes I find there is not much in the whole study I agree with because of that on the other hand there are probably more times I find a lot to learn despite that one point of disagreement. In historical reconstructions, the “innerancy” position can be a very thorny issue. In my stuff, more literary oriented work, it is much less an ‘obstacle’ to getting a lot out of a commentary or article.

Jim.

Hey Jim… you raise what is probably the most important question: when faith-based scholars allow “extraneous, inviolable axiomsâ€? to mold their research, does that preclude it from the category of good scholarship? (Of course, we shouldn’t assume that only faith-based scholars have “extraneous, inviolable axiomsâ€?). An example from a recent blog post will perhaps suffice: what role should the conservative evangelical doctrine of innerancy play in textual criticism? If one allows innerancy to play a part, I would consider this to be an example of when an “extraneous, inviolable axiomâ€? is allowed to play an inappropriate role in what is a historical question. So it ultimately comes down to method and being explicit of one’s method so that others can understand and evaluate your work on its basis. On the other hand, I don’t think a presupposition, e.g., of an open universe would disqualify one’s work from being good scholarship any more than presupposing a closed universe would automatically make qualify it.

In response to your question, Dave, I would think that many scholars are not aware of other scholar’s faith perspective so they wouldn’t automatically discredit their work — especially if their work employs a middle discourse and a historical critical method. It would be the work that is more addressed to the concerns of a faith community which would not fit the criteria that Fox assumes — but I don’t think that Fox would say these works are not scholarly or not worthwhile to read, it’s just that they are not traditional historical critical scholarhip (which is what I think Fox means when he employs the term Wissenschaft).

What I wonder about is exactly when does the importation of “extraneous, inviolable axioms” occur? It seems to me to be a huge grey area between being influenced by ones subjectivity and “importing” extraneous axioms. Even describing the situation like this calls attention to the value judgments implicit in this area of critical reflection on scholarship.

On the one hand, I do get quite frustrated when I read the occassional statment in scholarly work which suggests that Biblical studies should specifically address theological issues for the modern community of faith. I don’t see it as my job at all. On the other hand, I do not see it as the job of theologians or faith-based exegetes to serve my secular interests if they wish to consider themselves ‘scholars. Perhaps the two ways of looking at the Bible are more separate or self-contained than we often allow, but there has to along with that some way of learning from one another without implying that one has relied on ‘non-scholarly’work.

Jim Linville